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in Britain.2 Although well intentioned, supporters of the 2006 Pardon
Bill clung to the outmoded notion that a generation of brave “lions
were led by donkeys” to the slaughter. Death and Deliverance shows
that these “donkeys” seriously weighed the pros and cons of capital
punishment and—nine times out of ten—chose to be merciful. The
book is a true asset to military historians and a worthwhile read for
anyone looking to gain a better understanding of the First World War.
5

alyssa cundy , wilfrid laurier university

In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s Cold
War Army. Andrew B. Godefroy. Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2014. Pp. 292.
During the first two decades of the Cold War, with the invention of the
atomic bomb by the United States and its replication by the Soviet
Union, the Canadian Army was exposed to a completely new type
of warfare. In this extremely well-written and thoroughly researched
work, Andrew B. Godefroy explores what the Canadian Army did to
be successful on this new conventional-nuclear battlefield. Employing
a diverse collection of archival records and published material such as
the Canadian Army Journal and Volunteer Review and Military and
Naval Gazette, Godefroy introduces the reader with a much-needed
reinterpretation of the institutional development and organizational
culture of Canada’s early Cold War Army as well as an explanation
of how and why the army evolved as it did. The book further provides
important insights into how politics, military personalities, accident
and contingency as well as the impact of the information age affected
the design and the creation of a modern professional army prepared
to fight the battles of a conventional-nuclear war.
Godefroy’s work questions the prevailing historiography that the
postwar Canadian Army “lacked any strategic culture that could
enable it to innovate and adapt at the same level as its Cold Warera allies” (p. 11). As the author observes, this situation is the result
of the lack of investigation of the Canadian military innovation and
2
   Douglas C. Peifer, “The Past in the Present: Passion, Politics, and the Historical
Profession in the German and British Pardon Campaigns,” Journal of Military
History 71, no. 4 (October 2007): 1107–1132.
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adaptation process for the post-1945 period, studies having focused
until now on the higher levels of military politics or the lower level
of battlefield operations. Departing from those positions, Godefroy
adopts Paul Kennedy’s “history from the middle” approach,1 a far
more comprehensive analysis that helps understand the military
problem solving process of the “middle managers of war.” This
approach enables Godefroy to explore how and why the Canadian
Army officers (the captains, majors, and lieutenant-colonels) and
the civilian defence personnel (the scientists, designers, engineers,
technicians, and administrators of the army) got things done. In Peace
Prepared persuasively argues that the Canadian Army during the
early Cold War years had a strategic culture and was far more capable
of innovating and adapting than previous works have assumed.
Organized into six chapters, Godefroy’s study covers the Canadian
Army’s answer to the threat of a possible third world war between
the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the unification of the
three armed services into a single Canadian Forces in 1968. The
first chapter traces the development and maturation of the strategic
thinking culture of the land forces from the late nineteenth century
until the end of the Second World War. Chapter 2 examines the
influence of the demobilization on the army’s combat development
process and the army’s effort to reshape its frameworks to continue to
innovate and adapt in the five years following the Second World War.
Chapter 3 analyses the response of the Canadian Army in the first
half of the 1950s to military problems associated with the defence
of Canada, the conduct of limited “hot” war in Korea, and the
deterrence of war in Europe against the Soviet Union. The chapter
thus highlights the increasingly erroneous conclusions emerging from
the older methodologies and the need for the Canadian Army to
improve its use of quantitative data and adopt mathematical models
in military problem solving when approaching the conventionalnuclear battlefield.
Chapter 4 shows that, even though a portion of the Canadian
military between 1954 and 1958 did not understand the true
characteristics of atomic war, the army was able to solve many critical
military problems it faced, such as the need for true land mobility,
and to develop a systems-based approach to problem solving. Chapter
6

1
   Paul Kennedy, “History from the Middle: The Case of the Second World War,”
Journal of Military History 74 (2010): 35–74.
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5 explains how the existing army combat development organizations,
facing important budget cuts between 1958 and 1964, were able
to improve significant aspects of modern military problem solving
by adopting new quantitative methodologies, such as modern war
games, to analyze and evaluate the latest operational concepts in
the conventional-nuclear battlefield and, in this way, propose more
appropriate solutions. Chapter 6 details the difficult attempt of the
army to sustain institutional combat development during the process of
integration of the three armed services into a single unified Canadian
Forces between 1963 and 1968. According to Godefroy, with these
defence reforms, “the government essentially denied the army any
further control over its own vision and coerced the institution into
adopting a specific politically driven force structure derived neither
from analysis of the future security environment nor any robust land
force concept development and experimentation” (p. 210).
One of the author’s central objectives is to refute the prevailing
idea in the historiography that, because the Canadian Army was
not able to exert great influence over its Cold War allies, it lacked a
strategic culture and hence was not able to prepare for possible future
wars. As Godefroy explains, this position is not sustainable in regard
of the numerous evidences available to the researcher in the archives.
One could add that it would have been difficult—and still is—for
such a small military institution as the Canadian military to be a
major influence on American and British thinking, countries with
much larger and wealthier armies. Since the Canadian Army was part
of a greater alliance, its officials had to collaborate on the creation
of allied future operating concepts so that the Canadian formations
could be easily interoperable with its allies in future conflicts. It
was thus normal that the Cold War-era allied doctrine formed
the basis from which the Canadian Army would develop its own
distinctive capabilities in response to the Soviet threat. Even though
the Canadian Army had to follow the allied operating concepts, it
was able to critically think, innovate and adapt to the new battlefield
as well as effectively prepare its own components during the first
two decades of the Cold War. As Godefroy suggests: “As in other
NATO forces, conceptual and doctrinal design lay at the core of
the Canadian Army’s systemic approach to military problem solving
both in peace and war, and without it the army would have been
nothing other than a poorly armed mob” (p. 10).
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If In Peace Prepared traces back the institutional development
and organizational culture of Canada’s early Cold War Army, one
of its strengths is the author’s ability to show where the army
jurisdiction ended and the influence of the political sphere began. Of
course, the Canadian Army military problem solving process failed
on its own sometimes. But, as the author convincingly argues, the
impact of the Canadian political system was one of the many factors
that could also affect the process. In fact, even though the Canadian
Army developed an effective combat development cycle during the
first two decades of the Cold War, it is important to remember that
this process existed only to inform and guide civilian politicians and
bureaucrats’ force development decisions, not control them. When
there was a difference of views, especially in time of peace and when
the money was scarce, this could bring the politicians to ignore the
professional advice received from the military.
Although Godefroy’s overall argument and presentation are
very strong, one critique can be made with regard to content. It
would have been interesting to compare at some point the military
problem solving process and the solutions adopted by Canada’s Cold
War-era allies regarding the problems they all faced. In this way,
it would have been easier for the reader to assess the effectiveness
of the Canadian combat development process and see that the
Canadian Army was able to innovate and adapt at the level as is
suggested by the author.
Ultimately, by stressing the evolution of Canadian Army strategic
thinking and institutional development as well as what the Canadian
Army did to be successful on the new conventional-nuclear battlefield
during the first two decades of the Cold War, In Peace Prepared is
a major addition to Canadian historiography. Written in a clear and
compelling style, this work will appeal to academics and professional
military personnel who wish to learn how big and complex is the task
to plan, establish, build and manage a modern professional army.
caroline d ’ amours , royal military college of canada

Stout Hearts: The British and Canadians in Normandy, 1944. Ben
Kite. Solihull, UK: Helion and Company, 2014. Pp. 488.
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